Abstract. Hausman (2012) "selectively" reviews the CVM literature and fails to find progress over the 18 years since Diamond and Hausman (1994) argued that unquantified benefits and costs are preferred to benefits and costs quantified by CVM for policy analysis. In these comments, we provide counter-arguments to the claims made by Hausman. We provide these counterarguments not with the intent to convince the reader that the debate over contingent valuation is settled but rather to urge the community of economists to recognize that the intellectual debate over contingent valuation is still ongoing and that plenty of work remains to be done. We review the literature and argue that (1) hypothetical bias raises important research questions about the incentives guiding survey responses and preference revelation in both real and hypothetical settings that contingent valuation can help answer, (2) the WTP-WTA gap debate is far from settled and the debate raises important research questions about the future design and use of benefit cost analyses of which contingent valuation will undoubtedly be a part, and (3) CVM studies do, in fact, tend to pass a scope test and there is little support for the assertion that an adding up test is the definitive test of CVM validity.
Introduction
The contingent valuation method (CVM) has a tortured history, due to the skepticism among many economists of survey data and the high profile of the role of contingent valuation in litigation following the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Carson 2011) . Contingent valuation was developed because revealed preference methods (e.g., travel cost) that had been used to measure non-market values were limited. Benefit-cost analysis, and other types of policy analysis, required empirical estimates of value that were not, to that point, measureable. Contingent valuation surveys contain detailed descriptions of a hypothetical valuation scenario, payment vehicles (e.g., taxes), payment rules (e.g., majority rule) and valuation questions (e.g., referenda).
The initial motivation for the method came from three federal government agencies in the United
States from the 1940s through the 1970s. The National Park Service was seeking estimates of the economic value of park recreation and the Army Corps of Engineers was seeking estimates of water-based recreation (justifying dam building). Another key force was the need for empirical estimates of the value of risk reduction in environmental and health economics and the related role of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in the 1980s.
The major development that launched the current controversy was the recognition that the passive use values described by Krutilla (1967) could be estimated using contingent valuation.
Alan Randall et al.'s (1974) article in the first issue of the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management introduced more differentiation of contingent valuation surveys from opinion polls with the use of photographs to help describe the valuation scenario.
The mid-1970s through the 1990s was a period of intense methodological development and increased acceptance, with a broadening of applications beyond recreation and health, expansion to developing countries, and the publication of a number of influential overviews.
Two key milestones were the publication of the Mitchell and Carson (1989) book, which first integrated economic theory, survey research methods and social science measurement issues, and the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The Exxon Valdez oil spill first brought contingent valuation to the attention of many economists, government agencies and the courts. The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration assembled a "blue ribbon panel" to assess the method. The panel concluded that the method could provide accurate measures of passive use values under certain conditions and should be used for policy analysis (Arrow et al 1992) . The panel's recommendations created a number of testable hypotheses that emerged in the literature of the 1990s and 2000s. In response to the NOAA Blue Ribbon Panel's conditional endorsement of the contingent valuation method, a contingent of primarily Exxon-funded researchers published a compendium of critiques questioning the accuracy and validity of the method (Hausman 1993) .
Following this controversy regarding its accuracy, the contingent valuation method was the subject of a symposium in the American Economic Association's Journal of Economic Perspectives in 1994. Portney (1994) introduced the important issues. Hanemann (1994) defended the method. Diamond and Hausman (1994) argued that, for policy analysis, unquantified benefits and costs are preferred to benefits and costs quantified by CVM, and that expert opinion is preferred to imperfect contingent valuation estimates of value. While Diamond and Hausman raised a number of important issues, their negative opinion has done little to quell the demand for contingent valuation research. Since 1994, Google Scholar indicates that the number of contingent valuation studies has increased five-fold.
In the muck of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Journal of Economic Perspectives (JEP) has offered yet another symposium, revisiting the nightmare of the "CVM debate" that followed the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Kling, Phaneuf and Zhao (2012) provide a balanced interpretation of the usefulness of the CVM. Carson (2012) is optimistic about the progress researchers have made in the past twenty years, suggesting that, under the right circumstances, the CVM can be a useful valuation tool. Hausman (2012) "selectively" reviews the CVM literature and fails to find progress over the eighteen years since Diamond and Hausman (1994) . Kling, Phaneuf and Zhao (2012) and Carson (2012) offer some counterarguments to the assertions made by Hausman (2012) , and Hausman himself acknowledges a selective reading and interpretation of a vast literature that has developed in the last twenty years.
2 Yet
Hausman's claim that "three long-standing problems continue to exist" (p.43) --hypothetical bias, the divergence between willingness to pay and willingness to accept, and the lack of scope effects --went largely uncontested. It is to these claims that we respond in this reflection.
We provide counterarguments to these claims not with the intent to convince the reader that the debate over contingent valuation is settled in favor of the method, but rather to ensure that non-specialist economists and others recognize that the intellectual debate over contingent valuation is ongoing and that there remains plenty of research to be done by the intellectually curious, something we would hope even a skeptic would embrace. In short, we fundamentally disagree with, and more importantly provide evidence that contradicts, Hausman's conclusion 2 A comprehensive bibliography of over 7,500 scholarly papers and studies on contingent valuations is provided by Carson (2011 responses have no effect on anything he cares about. On the other hand, for a consequential survey, we may or may not predict hypothetical bias depending upon the survey's incentive structure.
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Hausman cites three studies which find that "intentions to purchase new products" are overstated: Jamieson and Bass (1989) , Hsiao et al. (2002) , and Morwitz et al. (2007) . However, as noted by Carson and Groves (2007, p .188), we should typically expect stated intentions to purchase new products to overstate true intentions. The logic is that by choosing "yes" (I would buy this product), the respondent increases the likelihood of having the product available for possible future purchase, under the reasonable assumption that the survey is being used to determine whether the new product should be brought to market. Utility is derived from an expansion of the individual's future choice set. The Jamieson and Bass (1989) intention studies concerning existing products are often used by manufacturers and suppliers when they need to make decisions about "whether to increase or reduce production levels, whether to change the size of the sales force, and whether to initiate a price change" (p.347).
However, it is not clear in this case exactly how responses will affect something the respondent cares about (i.e. product price). Thus we should not be surprised by the findings of these studies (and others cited therein) that stated purchase intentions for existing products have some predictive ability but that it is not particularly strong. 5 It is perhaps surprising that Hausman did not more carefully consider the incentive structure of the surveys used in these cited studies because he points out (p.45) that one possible cause of hypothetical bias is that the survey does not explicitly state how the survey responses will be used.
As a counter-example, consider the role of stated preference methods when they are used to expand the domain of preferences beyond the support of current experience. We can cite at behavior after low-intensity storms and about their stated preference behavior after both hypothetical low-intensity and hypothetical high-intensity storms. Two hurricanes followed the survey and respondents were surveyed again to determine their actual behavior. Models using revealed and stated preference evacuation data forecast revealed preference behavior with prediction error of less than 20%.
One of the four key areas of future stated preference research noted by Kling et al. (2012) is the need for validity tests on consequential surveys. They cite Vossler and Evans (2009) Carson and Groves paradigm for assessing the predictive ability of stated preference surveys has been extremely influential. 6 However, the concept is relatively new and so indeed more research is needed to examine whether inconsequential surveys suffer from unexpected degrees of hypothetical bias.
In the absence of true consequentiality, two approaches to hypothetical bias mitigation have become popular (Loomis 2011) . Some researchers find that the divergence between hypothetical and actual willingness pay is mitigated or eliminated by providing additional instructions to respondents explicitly encouraging them to treat the hypothetical scenario as if an actual monetary transaction were taking place (Cummings and Taylor 1999, List 2001) . Still more researchers advocate for various forms of 'scenario adjustment' including controlling for and netting out respondent admitted departures from the conditions described in the offered choice scenarios (Cameron and DeShazo 2013) or taking into account the level of certainty respondents have that they would actually make the same decision if the choice was real (Champ and Bishop 2001, Blumenschein et al. 2007 ). Adjusting for certainty produces "hypothetical"
results that are often close to "real" values and these alternative levels of WTP allow for sensitivity testing when CVM estimates are used in benefit-cost analysis (BCA) which leads us to assert that a range of numbers that likely includes accurate values is certainly better than no number.
B. Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept
Researchers have been troubled since the onset of stated-value elicitation surveys by the seemingly simple finding, perhaps obvious to some, that compensation demanded (willingness to accept) regularly exceeds compensation paid (willingness to pay Various efforts have been made to extend the neoclassical framework in a way that rationalizes the gap. Proponents of contingent valuation have attempted rationalizations of these differences, but have not overcome the findings of Diamond and Hausman (1994) or the results of Milgrom (1993) . Both papers demonstrate that the attempts to rationalize the well-recognized and persistent disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept fail as a matter of economic theory and observed empirical outcomes (p 47-48).
We find it troubling that Hausman fails to acknowledge the deep and continuing debate in the literature that is in large part responsive to his 1994 work with Diamond, yet has chosen to change his own opinion of contingent valuation from "dubious" to "hopeless." In a recent exploration of the impacts of reference dependence (i.e. endowment effects), Knetsch (2010) notes in a particularly relevant footnote: "One somewhat unfortunate consequence of the many reports of large disparities between WTA and WTP valuations in contingent valuation surveys, is that many, especially environmental economists, have taken these disparity findings to be the result of a problem of the inadequacy of contingent valuation methods to accurately measure people's values rather than taking it more seriously as one of people valuing losses more than gains" (p. 180). Knetsch goes on to argue that the appropriate measure of value (WTP or WTA)
will depend on the initial assignment of property rights, perceived or otherwise. This creates potential difficulties in the interpretation of benefit-cost analysis (see Sugden 2005 ) for a proposal for dealing with preference anomalies such as the endowment effect within the context 15 of benefit cost analysis). However, the prevalence of a WTP-WTA gap, or the existence of endowment effects, is not a fatal flaw in the contingent valuation method in and of itself.
Based on our own reading of the literature, we are not ready to close the WTP-WTA debate. And apparently, we are not alone:
A subtle controversy exists in the literature. At issue is the existence and interpretation of a possible gap between willingness to pay ("WTP") and willingness to accept 
C. Scope Test
Hausman argues that contingent valuation studies tend to fail the "scope test," and those that pass the test fail to pass it "adequately." At the same time, he acknowledges that "We do not know how large scope effects should be" (p. 48). We share Hausman's ignorance about what would constitute scope effect "adequacy." The simplest model of willingness to pay, a difference in expenditure functions with changes in quality or quantity, can be used to show that willingness to pay is nondecreasing in quality or quantity (Whitehead, Haab and Huang 1995) . The size of scope effects may be limited by diminishing marginal utility or substitution among nonmarket goods or between nonmarket and market goods. For example, Rollins and Lyke (1998) Hausman highlights the evidence provided by Desvousges, Mathews and Train (2012) who review 109 studies that report a scope test and find that 36% pass the test, 15% fail the test and the rest have mixed results. However, Desvousges, Mathews and Train (2012) find only a few studies that provide enough information to conduct an adding up test. The axiom of revealed preference (on the part of CVM researchers) suggests that internal and external scope tests are preferred to the adding up test. One reason for this is that the adding up test asks respondents in Sample 2 to assume that B has been provided by the policy process and payment has already been extracted. This more-complicated scenario substantially increases the cognitive difficulty of the valuation task (Hanemann, 1994) .
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Given the absence of any explicit adding up test for most of the 109 scope-effect papers in the literature, and the fact that the adding up test is not the only valid test for adequate sensitivity to scope, it is necessary to examine more closely the types of scope tests that are routinely conducted. When considering whether an individual study passes a scope test adequately, any meta-analysis should consider characteristics of the study that might drive scope-testing results. For example, the type of valuation question might play a role. Carson and Groves (2007) argue that a consequential referendum is more likely to produce scope effects. Smith and Osborne (1996) conduct a meta-analysis of studies focused on the value of changes in visibility at U.S. parks and find clear responsiveness of CVM estimates to scope. They warn, however, that scope predictions are sensitive to theoretical assumptions imposed during model estimation. Richardson and Loomis (2009) find that the size of the population change is statistically and economically significant in a meta-analysis of 67 willingness to pay estimates of threatened and endangered species allocation. In two specifications the scope elasticity of willingness to pay is not statistically different from one. Ojea and Loureiro (2011) undertake a meta-analysis of 355 biodiversity contingent valuation studies with a focus on the issue of scopetest satisfaction. They find that scope effects are more likely to be found when scope is measured absolutely instead of relatively.
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Other Issues
A. The Use of Experts
In response to questions about how to handle nonuse values in decision-making without recourse to stated preference surveys, Hausman advocates the use of experts: "[P]ublic policy will do better if expert opinion is used to evaluate specific projects, including non-use value…" (p.44). This argument is also made in the original Diamond and Hausman (1994) paper.
The first question this approach raises is: what kinds of experts these should be? It is hard to imagine that non-economists will be better equipped than economists to assess passive use value, or even to be familiar with the concept that it is appropriate to consider passive use values in the first place. For ecological services, for example, are we to substitute ecologist's subjective opinions about "intrinsic value" for the instrumental values required for benefit-cost analysis? How are these intrinsic values to be monetized? The second question is: why would experts be better than non-experts at determining the monetized nonuse values accruing to society? After all, decision-makers are usually interested in the preferences of the general 10 Amiran and Hagan's (2010) scope elasticity might be a useful way of summarizing the adequacy of scope effects in these studies.
19 public, so it is difficult to see how experts, as a highly selected sample from the general population, should be better informed about social values than non-experts, that is, a representative sample from the general public stating their own preferences directly. If we are discussing whether a given environmental project does or does not deliver a specific increment of physical ecological function, then generally an expert is better informed than the average person. But value is distinct from quantity. We might expect that the average person knows his own preferences better than the expert, conditional on full information.
The more practical question, and really the most fundamental one, is how can these alleged experts determine nonuse values without having first conducted at least an implicit stated preference study as the basis for their expertise in judging societal nonuse values? It is well known that the distinctive characteristic ofpassive use value is that there is no observable related behavior from which to judge people's willingness to make tradeoffs for the benefit in question.
The role of the stated preference survey, explicitly, is to create such a situation in which we can observe this willingness. Hausman's argument is that because stated preference surveys cannot reliably elicit information on preferences, then an expert panel is preferred. The problem is that no expert can claim to know the preferences of a particular population without having first made some informal observations about people's willingness to make tradeoffs. Hausman also argues that values deriving from altruism should not be incorporated into BCA, and that it is difficult to identify and exclude altruistic values from stated preference studies. Bergstrom (1982) indeed showed that the rule for the Pareto efficient level of a public good (the Samuelson rule) is the same in the presence or absence of altruism. This implies that we require purely "selfish" values -excluding altruistic values -for determining optimal outcomes. However, one of the assumptions made by Bergstrom was that the considered change be small and that the economy be already near the Pareto efficient level of the public good.
Flores (2002) showed that for discrete (large) changes in the public good, such as are often the subject of CV studies, the selfish benefit-cost test is sufficient but not necessary for making an efficient decision. That is, it is possible to fail to accept a good proposal (from a BCA point of view) using only selfish values. Bergstrom (2006) agrees with this conclusion.
C. Unstable and Inconsistent Preferences
A recurring theme throughout Hausman's paper is the assertion of unstable preferences as an indictment of CVM methods. For example:
"…the primary argument that is relevant for thinking about contingent valuation methods as a whole is that the answers from such studies are unstable and inconsistent, invented for the moment of the survey, and cannot be treated as preferences in the sense that economist understand that term." (p. 53) Reliability is the extent to which a valuation method consistently generates the same measure. Reliability tests focus on the within and across study variation in estimates rather than the ability of studies to produce unbiased estimates of value. The lower the variability in estimates, the more consistent and the less influenced by researcher decisions are the estimates.
High variability allows seemingly innocuous decisions by practitioners to significantly influence results in one direction or another, so unreliable results cannot be defended against the criticism that the researcher may be determining the result.
Most CVM research finds that willingness to pay values have some degree of stability over time. Test-retest, or temporal, reliability involves conducting more than one CVM survey with time between surveys with the same or a different sample of respondents. If the magnitude of willingness to pay is consistent across time then willingness to pay is considered temporally reliable (e.g., Carson et al., 1997) . However, a difference in willingness to pay over time does not necessarily indicate unreliable results. If willingness to pay changes over time in response to changing factors that would be expected to affect willingness to pay, such as bubbles in housing markets or a significant recession, for example, then the researcher may still conclude the results are reliable (e.g., Whitehead and Hoban, 1999) . Overall, it is important that CVM studies demonstrate some degree of both validity and reliability.
We are also not convinced that unstable or constructed preferences are unique to CVM.
The formation of preferences has to begin somewhere. The formation of preferences on the spot in a survey does not necessarily invalidate them for those who have no prior preferences or experience. When confronted with unfamiliar but interesting products in real markets, people also sometimes make impulsive, spontaneous, or ill-advised purchases that they may subsequently regret. Perhaps the preferences elicited by CVM are in their "infancy" stage, but this can be true for market goods and services as well (new products are introduced all the time). It is also probably safe to say that (almost) everyone has well-formed preferences for money, so one can at least make a "no-purchase" decision based on well-defined preferences for "all other goods" relative to the proposed public good with unfamiliar qualities (expressed by a vote against the provision of that good in a consequential referendum).
Conclusions
Hausman (2012) makes an effort to debunk the CVM once and for all, thereby removing it from the research agenda and from use in decision-making about public policy. We argue instead that (1) the existence (or nonexistence) of hypothetical bias continues to raise important research questions about the incentives guiding survey responses and preference revelation in real as well as hypothetical settings, and contingent valuation can help answer these questions, (2) the WTP-WTA gap debate is far from settled and the debate raises important research 24 questions about the future design and use of benefit cost analyses in which contingent valuation will undoubtedly play a part, and (3) CVM studies do, in fact, tend to pass a scope test and there is little support for the argument that the adding up test is the definitive test of CVM validity. It is our conclusion that Hausman's "selective review" of the literature is demonstrably biased in favor of studies that are negative towards the CVM. As a result, Hausman's conclusion is preordained. We are in complete agreement with Carson (2012) who concludes "the time has come to move beyond endless debates that seek to discredit contingent valuation and to focus instead on making it better."
